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This article investigates the relation between psychoanalysis, feminism and 
colonialism. The metaphor of “the dark continent,” which reveals how modern 
psychoanalysis has interpreted the “woman” in the light of categories produced in the 
colonial context, is put under scrutiny through Ranjana Khanna’s definition of 
psychoanalysis as a colonial discipline; while Judith Butler’s correlations between 
desire, performativity and gender, and the unfolding of a “becoming” subject such as 
“the transexual woman” as theorized by Fabrizia Di Stefano, reflect the complexities of 
the search for a common term able to recognize all the different political collectivities 
of feminism. Moving against this theoretical and critical background, the contribution 
shows the cruciality of looking into the tension between “transnational feminism” and 
the ethically powerful univocity of the term “woman”, as in Simone de Beauvoir’s claim 
to a cultural-historical becoming of the “woman”, albeit within the refusal of the idea of 
an ontologised and substantial feminine identity. 
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Dark continents 
The well-known metaphor of the “dark continent”, that was first passed down by 
explorer Henry Morton Stanley in reference to “dark” Africa, has provided the image 
of the woman, namely of female sexuality, as an “impenetrable mystery” since Freud’s 
times to nowadays.1 
According to Ranjana Khanna, author of Dark Continents. Psychoanalysis and 
Colonialism (2003), the metaphor of the dark continent reveals that modern 
psychoanalysis has interpreted the “woman” in the light of categories produced in the 
colonial context (Khanna 2003, ix). As a matter of fact, Khanna defines psychoanalysis 
as a colonial discipline, insisting on the contingency of Europe’s grand narratives 
(including concepts of the “modern” self, civilization, and nationhood) to coloniality 
(Khanna 2003, 10). Psychoanalysis is represented as “a form of analysis based in the 
age of colonialism and constitutive of concepts of the primitive against which the 
civilizing mission could establish itself” (Khanna 2003, 6).2 
In postwar France, existential psychoanalysis was unmistakably deemed to arise 
from colonialism and the Negritude movement,3 as the anticolonialist forewords that 
Sartre wrote for Albert Memmi’s, Frantz Fanon’s, and Leopold Senghor’s works aptly 
clarify (Khanna 2003, 29). In these writings Sartre states that he conceives collective 
identity as the effect of a situation, a precise context. Every group identity is 
superimposed; this is the reason why every form of identification “that was not 
situation-bound and situation-conscious” is doomed to be inauthentic (Khanna 2003, 
140).4 
 It is exactly the insistence on the idea of subjectivity, meant as an “effect” of specific 
social-historical contexts, namely the ethical imperative to configure subjectivity as 
the expression of a fairer society, that situates Simone de Beauvoir’s thought within 
the ethical question raised by decolonisation and anti-colonialist efforts.  
 The fact that feminine identity was usually likened to other marginalised identities 
such as the Black soul and the Jewish character, that were considered fixed identitarian 
concepts, led de Beauvoir to refuse the idea of an ontologised and substantial feminine 
identity, and then to insist on how identity is a result of cultural-historical becoming, 																																																								
1 The expression comes from the title of Stanley’s account of how he managed to find explorer David 
Livingstone (Stanley 1878). 
2 On the relationship between colonizer and colonized, and on the epistemological question of 
knowledge and representation in colonial contexts, see Said 1978. On the complicity between European 
colonialism and cultural productions (literature, art, philosophical theories, etc.) see Said 1994.  
3 Léopold Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas, Birago Diop were among the black poets and 
intellectuals, from the Antilles and Africa, who during the Thirties gave birth to the so called Négritude 
Movement in Paris. Négritude was meant to celebrate pride in blackness and the values of African 
cultural specificity as well as the poetic epiphany of the lost African motherland. Négritude was 
especially conceived as a form of cultural and political resistance to colonial assimilation and 
annihilation (see Chevrier 1986).  
4 For Sartre’s preface to Senghor, see Sartre 1948a. In 1945-48 Sartre wrote both Black Orpheus and 
Anti-Semite and Jew, two very influential texts for the Negritude Movement as well as for the 
psychiatric and psychological readings offered by Frantz Fanon and Octave Mannoni, whose enquiries 
into the psychic strife of the colonized were pivotal in linking psychoanalysis with coloniality. For 
Sartre’s preface to Fanon, see Fanon 1967; for Sartre’s preface to Albert Memmi, see Memmi 1965. On 
Sartre’s concepts of collective identity, see Sartre 1948. 
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instead, which she epitomised in her famous statement: “One is not born a woman, but, 
rather, becomes one” (de Beauvoir 1973, 301).5  
 In the wake of de Beauvoir, and in more recent times, a remarkable number of 
feminist philosophers within Western thought, ranging from Hélène Cixous to Luce 
Irigaray, from Julia Kristeva to Sarah Kofman, up to Judith Butler, to mention only a 
few, have pointed their finger at that phallocentric system that has stressed, for ages, 
the relationship between woman and body, and the non-transcendence of woman:6 
regarded as mother and wet-nurse, affectivity and emotionality, as a space of domestic 
immanence and contingency, nature and body, the woman is traditionally far from the 
masculine “I” that is assumed as the universal subject, defined in terms of spirituality, 
culture, reason and incorporeality – as Sidonie Smith has aptly noted in her study on 
the “subjectivity of embodiment” (Smith 1993, 7). The woman is not included in the 
universality that defines the masculine subject. And if such universal masculine subject 
is culturally constituted as mind, spirit, reason, namely as something incorporeal, at 
the same time it has confined the others, among them the woman, to the status of 
‘body’ and corporeality (Smith 1993, 1-17).  
Performing genders 
In The Second Sex (1949), Simone de Beauvoir had already highlighted that woman 
could be determined and differentiated in relation to man, but the reverse was not 
thinkable. Woman is non-essential compared to the essential. Man is the Subject, the 
Absolute, whereas Woman is the Other. After five decades, Sidonie Smith quotes 
Judith Butler, directly drawing on de Beauvoir’s insights, when referring to woman as 
“other” and “body”:  
Masculine disembodiment is only possible on the condition that women occupy 
their bodies as their essential and enslaving identities. […] By defining women as 
“Other”, men are able through the shortcut of definition to dispose of their bodies, 
to make themselves other than their bodies – a symbol potentially of human decay 
and transience, of limitation generally – and to make their bodies other than 
themselves. From this belief that the body is Other, it is not a far leap to the 
conclusion that others are their bodies, while the masculine “I” is the 
noncorporeal soul. The body rendered as Other – the body repressed or denied 
and, then, projected – reemerges for this “I” as the view of others as essentially 
body. Hence, women become the Other; they come to embody corporeality itself. 
This redundancy becomes their essence (Smith 1993, 11). 
Clearly, it is a dualistic thought solely featuring two identities, masculine and 
feminine, that are simply identified according to the kind of body one dwells in, namely 
according to the different genital organs possessed. However, Judith Butler pushes 
ahead the reflections on this seeming dualism that has organized Western thought 
thoroughly, or rather the Judaic-Christian thought, as the philosopher clarifies.  
																																																								
5 According to de Beauvoir, bad faith, a central concept in French existentialist philosophy, consists 
of inattributing to the verb “to be” a substantial meaning, whereas the dynamic Hegelian sense of the 
term, that is to say “to be” in the sense of “to have become” should be underlined. On the idea of 
“inauthenticity” (from which bad faith results) see De Beauvoir 1973, 20. 
6 Kofman, for instance, re-interprets Freud in the attempt to “unmask” the Freudian image of the 
woman as a “riddle” (Kofman 1985). 
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 Butler has deeply explored the complexity of the sex/gender relation, where sex is 
generally meant to be a biological and organic factor, while gender is meant to be the 
system of cultural significations attributed to a sexed body. In Butler’s view, accepting 
the exclusive existence of two genders, masculine and feminine, firstly implies that 
there is an absolutely mimetic relationship between sex and gender. The male sexual 
organ would correspond to the masculine gender, just like the female sexual organ 
would correspond to the feminine gender. The problem, instead, is much more 
complex, as Simone de Beauvoir suggested when, in the first pages of The Second Sex, 
she wrote that being of sexually female was not sufficient in order to be a woman, 
since femininity is a mystery rather than a secretion of ovaries, and it could not be 
dragged down by a skirt from some sort of Platonic sky. She concluded that if 
femininity had almost disappeared, it was because it had actually never existed.  
 This is the crucial intuition that Judith Butler employs when stating that there is 
no certain, one-to-one correspondence between sexual organ and gender. On the 
contrary, it is desire that “directs”, “pushes” towards a specific gender. The gender 
towards which desire “directs”, has to be “interpreted”, just like a character; a role to 
be “performed”. 
 Gender, then, is conceived as an ensemble of cultural meanings that the sexed body 
acquires, therefore a specific gender cannot be said to derive necessarily from one of 
the two sexes. Besides, between sexed body and gender there would be a drastic 
discontinuity. If gender reveals to be a cultural construction, not necessarily 
depending on the possession of female or male genitals, then the terms man and 
masculine can easily signify a female body as much as a male one. Accordingly, woman 
and feminine can signify a male body as much as a female one. 
 Gender, therefore, is first presented as performativity, namely a practice, from which 
human beings result as a series of actions and modes that gradually perform and define 
their being, rather than a core that pre-exists their agency. In other words, identity 
shows its performative nature, a practice: “identity is what you do, identity is doing” 
(De Chiara 2001, 66). 
 Ultimately, this means that there is no possibility to find a core, an essence of the 
subject directly deriving from his/her biological sex. There is only a “staging” of the 
subject, his/her “performance”, a “mise-en-scène” of the subject that deploys his/her 
being in a costant “becoming”.  
As Ranjana Khanna notices, whereas Western feminism has initially stressed the 
question of inequality between women and men, and among women themselves, both 
on the political level and on the level of representativity, in the 1990s there was a 
remarkable turning point fostered by Lacanian psychoanalysis and centred on the 
theory of desire, that has proven to be a very useful tool for socio-cultural 
identification (Khanna 2003, 217). This is the case of  Gender Trouble. Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity (1990), where Judith Butler closely dialogues with Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, thus launching future struggles in queer theory. 
 The encounter with psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on the unconscious, sexual 
drives, hidden desires, repression mechanisms and the body’s denied reasons have led 
to theorisations of the feminine identity that are definitely opposed to those elaborated 
by a centuries-old patriarchal discourse (aptly termed “phallogocentrism” by French 
feminist thought during the Seventies).  
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 Judith Butler’s thought intertwines Lacanian psychoanalytical intuitions with 
Michel Foucault’s episteme.7 Butler elaborates a notion of identity as something 
originating from a very complex dialogue between desire, on the one hand, and law, on 
the other. The law Butler refers to, following Michel Foucault, is a system that labels 
subjects according to their sexualization. Indeed, in Foucault’s view, the distinction 
between sexes represents the main framework pursuing the normalisation and 
surveillance within the social body. Sexualization would then be uncovered as the law 
that “normalizes” human bodies, providing the frame to interpret the whole social 
body and knowledge itself (Butler 1990, 16-34). 
 Butler notes that identity is governed by normative discourses, practices and 
institutions that always constitute the subject as a ‘subject before the Law’. 
Consequently, subjectivity cannot be easily accomplished, since it manifests itself as a 
normative ideal on which an alleged consistency and continuity between sex and 
gender, desire and sexual practices, is projected. However, this notion of subject or 
human being – absolutely coinciding with unspoken normative requirements – falls 
into a crisis with the appearance of modes that are inconsistent and discontinuous 
compared to the pre-established and culturally internalized gender norms. This is the 
case, also, of the several forms of homosexuality and transvestism, that are explicit 
instances of a failed coincidence between the “biological” element, namely the sexual 
organ, and the manifested gender desire, as Butler remarks in Gender Trouble 
specifically referring to Foucault’s studies on the hermaphrodite Herculine Barbin 
(Foucault 1980b; see also Bulter 1990, 94-100).  
 Interpreting identity as a “performance”, “mise-en-scène”, “staging” of the subject 
occurring due to “desire”, would be of help for psychoanalysis to overcome its limits. 
Ethical questions: the transsexual woman 
As  underlined by transsexual philosopher Fabrizia Di Stefano in her interesting 
essay “Perché gli uomini non piangono”, published in 2009 in DWF, the question 
which psychoanalysis (since Freud) refuses to answer is: what is a woman, what is a 
man? There are, actually, other kinds of questions connected to desire and the relation 
between sexes. Therefore, if the transsexual cannot be a woman tout-court, it is first of 
all because such being is beyond the reach of both psychoanalytical and philosophical 
formulations. The philosopher confirms that being, as such, is beyond sense as far as 
sex is concerned. Hence, the definition of sense in itinere enunciating itself: the 
transsexual woman. 
 The famous question posed by Simone de Beauvoir, “what is a woman?”, also 
echoes in Fabrizia Di Stefano’s remarks on the current status of psychoanalysis and 
philosophy, when she reminds us that the free unfolding of a “becoming” subject 
requires an alert “ethical” attention meant to welcome the many and different tones 
and inflections of subjectivity (Di Stefano 2009, 38-50). Are we ready, for instance, for 
an ethos that envisages the free unfolding of transsexuality? What is the high price 
that transsexual people pay nowadays in terms of psychic and physical violence?  
 Since the ethical question in feminism is undeniably pivotal, the term “ethics” has 
proven to be hard to decipher: it ranges from indicating a generic idea of “fairness” to 
what is acceptable or unacceptable before the Law, therefore regarding locally 																																																								
7 Butler refers especially to Foucault 1980a. 
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recognised behavioural codes. In other cases, the term would coincide with what is 
political, meant as the specific ground of ethical agency (Khanna 2003, 209). Feminism 
has always had to privilege a pragmatic vision directly engaged with the contingent 
needs of women, and that is the reason why ethics and politics are almost synonyms in 
feminist thought.8  
In the final part of Dark Continents, Khanna describes the melancholic shadow 
feminism is saturated with, in Europe and in the United States, after the death of de 
Beauvoir, the mother of modern feminism. The search for a common term able to 
recognize all the different political collectivities resulted for some in the adoption of 
so-called “post-feminism”; yet this was also perceived as a “transnational feminism” 
that got lost in the multiple differences deconstructing the univocity of the term 
“woman”. As a consequence, these recent elaborations often feature some kind of 
nostalgia for a more “ethical”, political and reliable feminism, like the one represented 
by de Beauvoir (Khanna 2003, 208).9 
 For this reason, in the chapter Khanna dedicates to de Beauvoir, the epigraph 
quotes the words Luce Irigaray wrote when the French philosopher died in 1986. 
Irigaray wanted to remind us that Simone de Beauvoir’s theoretical and practical work, 
always pursuing social justice, has left an enormous legacy, mainly consisting in the 
opening of a wide horizon of liberation for a lot of men and women.10 This is, indeed, 
her ethical and libertarian call that still stands though so much time has passed.  
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